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Cahill: Brady Waivers in Plea Agreements

NOTE
UNITED STATES V. RUIZ: ARE

PLEA AGREEMENTS
CONDITIONED ON BRADY
WAIVERS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine for a moment that you are a defense attorney,
representing a client who has been accused of a robbery. You
learn that the prosecution's sole witness is the victim, who
identified your client from a line-up of individuals with a record
of similar criminal conduct. As you expect, the prosecution
offers your client a plea agreement. If your client pleads guilty,
the prosecution will recommend a reduced sentence to the court
for taking responsibility, cooperating and avoiding a timeconsuming trial. The prosecution then presents your client
with an agreement stating that if your client waives his right
to receive impeachment evidence, the prosecution will
recommend a reduced sentence to the court. Fearing the
consequences of a jury conviction and the maximum sentence
being imposed, your client agrees to accept the plea agreement.
You advise your client that, while the plea agreement seems
attractive, he should not waive his right to receive
impeachment evidence. Simultaneously and unbeknownst to
you, the prosecution's sole witness expresses doubt regarding
the identification of your client. The witness explains that the
robbery took place very quickly and he was badly frightened
and was now unsure whether he had identified the right man.
Because a trial does not appear to be in the foreseeable future
and a plea bargain has already been offered, the prosecutor
withholds this information. Wanting to avoid a trial and the
possibility of a much harsher sentence, and not realizing the
witness' reservations, your client ignores your warning, accepts
1
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the plea agreement and pleads guilty. Subsequently, you
discover the witness' uncertainty and seek to have your client's
guilty plea reversed. The court, however, rules that your client
knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to waive
his right to impeachment evidence. Thus, your client's guilty
plea and conviction stand. l
While the facts above are hypothetical, the situation itself
is plausible. 2 And until recently, prosecutors in both the
Southern and Northern Districts of California systematically
engaged in the practice of including waivers of impeachment
evidence in plea agreements. 3 Although including this waiver
in plea agreements expedited the processing of simple cases,
thereby alleviating the prosecution's heavy workload, the
practice has jeopardized the truth-seeking nature upon which
our criminal justice system is based.
In United States u. Ruiz, 4 the Ninth Circuit ruled that such
waivers are unconstitutional, violating the principle that
defendants in criminal cases must knowingly and voluntarily
plead guilty for the plea to be constitutionally valid. 5 The
purpose of this article is to discuss the law leading up to the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ruiz, to examine the court's ruling
itself, and to analyze the impact this decision could have on
plea bargaining, an integral part of the criminal justice system.
In Part II, this Note discusses Ruizs facts and procedural
history. Part III, section A outlines the prosecution's duty to
disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence as set forth by
the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Brady u.
Maryland 6 and its progeny. Part III, section B discusses the
nature of guilty pleas, focusing on the several types of waivers
that flow from such pleas. Part IV critiques the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Ruiz. Finally, Part V concludes that the Ninth
Circuit properly held that plea agreements containing Brady
waivers cannot constitutionally be entered into and that they
1 Introduction based in part on facts taken from, Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure
and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 957 (1989).
2 See id. at 968-97 (discussing the possibility that without mandatory Brady
disclosures defendants can be induced into self condemnation).
3
Erica G. Franklin, Waiuing Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A
Debate on the Merits of 'Viscouery" Waiuers, 51 STAN. L.REY. 567, 568-69 (1999).
4
241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001).
6 Id. at 1165.
6
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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obstruct the truth-seeking function of our system of criminal
justice.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mter Angela Ruiz was arrested for, and subsequently
charged with, importing marijuana from Mexico to the United
States, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of California offered her a plea agreement. 7 The plea
agreement required Ruiz to plead guilty within thirty days of
her initial appearance, file no motions, waive her right to an
indictment and appeal and waive her right to receive
impeachment evidence. 8 In exchange, the Government would
recommend a two-level downward departure to the sentencing
judge. 9 This type of agreement, known as a "fast track" plea
agreement, was adopted to minimize the expenditure of
Government resources and expedite the processing of more
routine cases.lO The proverbial "carrot-on-the-stick" for
defendants to enter the agreement was the Government's
recommendation for a sentence reduction to the sentencing
judge. 11
Ruiz, however, refused to accept the "fast track" agreement
on the basis that it contained what she believed to be an

7

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1160.

a Id. at 1161. The waiver in the plea agreement stated:

WANER OF RIGHT TO BE PROVIDED
WITH IMPEACHMENT AND
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE INFORMATION
The Government represents that any information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant known to the undersigned prosecutor in this case has
been turned over to the defendant. The Government understands it has a
continuing duty to provide such information establishing factual innocence of the
defendant.
The defendant understands that if this case proceeded to trial, the Government
would be required to provide impeachment information relating to any
In addition, if the defendant raised an
informants or other witnesses.
affirmative defense, the Government would be required to provide information in
its possession that supports such a defense. In return for the Government:s
promises set forth in this agreement, the defendant waives the right to this
information, and agrees not to attempt to withdraw the guilty plea or to me a
collateral attack based on the existence of this information.
Id. at 1166 (emphasis in original).
9 Id. at 1161.
10 Id. at 1160.
11 Id. at 1161.
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unconstitutional waiver of her Brady rights.12 As a result, Ruiz
was indicted by a grand jury and arraigned. 13 Two months
after her initial appearance, Ruiz pled guilty to the charges of
marijuana importation without the benefit of the "fast track"
plea agreement. 14Nevertheless, at her sentencing hearing Ruiz
requested the two-level downward departure that had
originally been offered to her as part of the "fast track" plea
agreement. 15 This two-level downward departure would have
brought Ruiz's sentencing range to twelve to eighteen
months. 16 Despite refusing to sign the plea agreement and
thereby waiving her right to impeachment evidence, Ruiz
insisted that she had substantially complied with the
requirements under the "fast track" program and was entitled
to the Government's downward departure recommendation to
the sentencing judge. 17 The Government, however, opposed the
downward departure because of Ruiz' failure to sign the plea
agreement and to consent to the waiver of her right to receive
impeachment evidence of government witnesses. 18
The district court denied Ruiz's request for the sentencing
departure because the Government did not make a "fast track"
recommendation and Ruiz had not entered into a plea
agreement that would require such a departure from the
regular sentencing range. 19 Ultimately, Ruiz was sentenced to
eighteen months in jai1. 20 Ruiz appealed her sentence to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 21
12 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1161. According to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and
its progeny, prosecutors have a duty to disclose "favorable evidence to an accused" if
the evidence is "material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87. This disclosure
requirement applies to impeachment evidence as well. Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1985). While Ruiz argued the waiver was unconstitutional, the dissent
pointed out that no evidence showed that she initially refused to sign the "fast track"
plea agreement on that premise. Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1171. The lower court had made no
factual finding on the matter. Id. at 1168.
13 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1171. After the arraignment, Ruiz's appearance bond was
revoked and she was remanded into custody for testing positive for cocaine and PCP.
Id.
14
Id. at 1161
15 Id.
16 Id.
Without the benefit of the "fast track" plea agreement Ruiz was facing a
sentencing range from 18 to 24 months. Id.
17 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1161.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit granted review of this case for the
purpose of deciding two issues: 1) whether the right to Brady
information can constitutionally be waived as a condition to
receiving the benefits of a plea bargain; and 2) whether the
Government can constitutionally withhold recommendations
for sentencing departures based on a defendant's refusal to
waive her right to Brady materia1. 22
III. BACKGROUND

A.

THE BRADY RULE

In Brady v. Maryland23 the United States Supreme Court
held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment
• • • ".24 In reaching its holding, the Court relied on Mooney v.
Holohan 25 and Pyle v. Kansas 26 and extended the somewhat
narrower principles articulated in those cases to create what
has become known as the Brady rule. 27 In Mooney, the Court
ruled that the knowing use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution to secure a conviction was "inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice" and as such was a violation of
due process. 28 The Court's holding in Mooney was later
broadened in Pyle. 29 In that case, the Court reaffirmed
Mooney s holding and extended the scope of due process
violations to encompass the deliberate suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused by state authorities. 30
Id.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
24 Id. at 87. In Brady, the Court overruled John Brady's death sentence because
the prosecution failed to produce evidence of the actual killer's confession that had
been requested by Brady's lawyer. Id. at 86.
25 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
26 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
27 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86·88.
28 Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.
29 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87.
30 Pyle, 317 U.S. at 215-16.
In Brady, the Court adopted the Third Circuit's
interpretation of the statement in Pyle to mean that "the suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused was itself sufficient to amount to a denial of due process.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court further relied on its holding in Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959) that a due process violation occurs "when the state, although not
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Brady, 373 U.S.
22

23
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The Brady Court's holding was an extension from
prohibiting the knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a
conviction, into a constitutional rule of discovery prohibiting
the Government's failure to supply exculpatory information to
the defendant upon request. 31 The Brady Court set up three
requirements for a defendant to challenge the validity of his
conviction based on the Government's suppression of
evidence. 32 First, the defendant had to show that the evidence
the Government withheld was favorable. 33 Second, the
defendant had to show the evidence the Government withheld
was material either to the determination of guilt or
Finally, the defendant had to request
punishment. 34
production of the exculpatory information from the
prosecution. 35
Not only did Brady require that the accused prove these
elements, the wording of Brady lent itself to the interpretation
that the Government had to be aware of the exculpatory
evidence for a duty to disclose the evidence to be triggered. 36
Since Brady, however, courts have increased the amount of
information presumed to be within the prosecutions knowledge
to all information gathered in connection with its office's
investigation of a specific case. 37 Thus, while the prosecution
has no duty to disclose exculpatory information of which it is
not aware, the prosecution cannot avoid its disclosure
obligation by keeping itself ignorant of evidence that the
investigation has produced. 3s

at 87.
31
32

Brady, 373 U.S. at 86·88.
Id. at 87.

Id.
Id.
35 Id.
This request requirement was subsequently dropped in United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), which held that, "if the [Brady) evidence is so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to
produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made." Agurs, 427 U.S. at
107.
36 See generally Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995). In Sanchez,
the Ninth Circuit interpreted Brady as requiring an awareness element by the
Government. Id. at 1453.
37 21A AM. JUR. 2d § 1271 (1998).
38 Id.
33

34
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1. Ethical Duty to Disclose
In light of the deception engaged in by the prosecution in
the cases leading up to and including Brady, the United States
Supreme Court justified the rule set forth in Brady on the
ground that the federal government has a duty to seek justice
above all else. 39 Society, the Court declared, benefitted not only
from the conviction of its criminals, but also from the public
belief in the fairness of that process. 40 And for true justice to
be achieved, prosecutors must act in a fair manner. 41
Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct42
echoes the Brady rule and its idealism. 43 In fact, Rule 3.8 is
more demanding than the Brady rule, requiring the disclosure
of not only exculpatory evidence, but evidence that mitigates
the offense charged to the defendant. 44 Not surprisingly, the
comment to Rule 3.8 also reflects the Court's sentiment in
Brady that "a prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence."45
Despite the obvious ethical grounds underlying the Brady
rule, however, the Court in United States v. Agurs46 announced
that the prosecutor's constitutional obligation ~o disclose Brady
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
[d. at 87.
4\ [d. at 87-88.
42 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8 (1999). Rule 3.8 reads in
pertinent part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to
the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the
tribunal[.]
[d.
39

40

43

[d.

[d.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 3.8 cmt. (1999). See also Lisa
M. Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1205, 1213 (2000) (concluding that "the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable
to the defense is an inherent and important part of a prosecutor's ethical
responsibilities. ").
46 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
44

45
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material is not measured by his "moral culpability or
willfulness. "47 Rather, the Court held, "[i]f the suppression of
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the
character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."48
Still, in Agurs, the Court concluded that the prosecutor's role
as the seeker of justice "illuminates the standard of materiality
that governs his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence."49
The Court's best expression regarding the purpose
underlying the Brady rule, however, may be in United States v.
Bagley.50 There, the Court stated that "[t]he Brady rule is
based on the requirement of Due Process. Its purpose is not to
displace the adversary system as the primary means by which
truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice
does not occur."51

2. Brady B Requirements
a. Time of Disclosure
Generally, the Government's duty to disclose Brady
material is ongoing. 52 Thus, even when information becomes
available at trial, the Government has a duty to inform the
defendant. 53 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
gone so far as to hold that, "[t]he government's obligation to
make such disclosures is pertinent not only to an accused's
preparation for trial but also to his determination of whether or
not to plead guilty."54 Under this rationale, the time required
for the disclosure of Brady material by the prosecution would
have to be as early as possible, not just before trial, so as to
provide a defendant with the capability to enter the most
informed plea possible. 55 Regardless of when the prosecutor is
required to disclose Brady evidence, the Court, since its

54

[d. at 110.
[d.
[d. at 11I.
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
[d. at 675.
21A AM. JUR. 2d §1271 (1998).
[d.
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998).

55

[d.

47
48
49

50
51
52

53
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decision in Brady, has eliminated the requirement that the
accused must first request the information. 56
b. Evidence Must Be Favorable to the Defendant
In Brady, the Government suppressed evidence of a
confession by Brady's co-defendant that he, rather than Brady,
actually committed the murder. 57
While not exactly
exculpatory, the evidence was important to show the jury that
Brady had only helped to plan the murder, rather than actually
committing the murder. 58 The Court found this evidence to be
important enough to require the reversal of Brady's death
sentence because the jury had the option of sentencing Brady
to life imprisonment rather than death. 59 Had the jury heard
evidence of the co-defendant's confession, the jury could have
imposed a different sentence. 60 Thus, the evidence was deemed
to be favorable to Brady despite the fact that it was not
completelyexculpatory.61
In Giglio v. United States,62 the Court expanded the scope
of favorable evidence to include both evidence that was at some
level exculpatory and impeachment evidence of a Government
witness or evidence that showed bias or prejudice. 63 In Bagley
the Court affirmed its holding in Giglio, adding that
impeachment evidence was favorable to the accused because if
"disclosed and used effectively, it [could] make the difference
between conviction and acquittal." 64
This is not to say that the Brady rule requires the
disclosure of all of the prosecution's material for the benefit of

Agurs, 427 u.s. at 107. See also supra text accompanying note 35.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 84-85 (1969). Brady had requested evidence of several
statements made by his co-defendant. [d. While the Government turned over several
of those statements, the confession was not turned over to Brady until after the trial,
appeal, and the affirmation of Brady's guilt by the appellate court. [d. at 83.
58 [d. at 84-85.
59 [d.
60 [d. at 83.
6t
Brady, 373 U.S. at 88-89.
62 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
63 [d. at 154.
64 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675. The impeachment evidence in Bagley and Giglio was
evidence that the Government would promise not to prosecute the key witness in
return for his testimony on behalf of the Government. See generally Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
56

57
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the defense. 65 As the Bagley Court held, "the prosecutor is not
required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to
disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed,
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial ... ".66 Thus, while it
is clear that the government must disclose exculpatory and
impeachment evidence to the defendant, it is not required to
"divulge every scintilla of evidence that might conceivably
inure to the defendant's benefit ... ".67
c. The Materiality Standard and Guilty Pleas
The United States Supreme Court has held that a finding
of materiality is proper if an evaluation of the Brady evidence
would lead the court to conclude that in any reasonable
likelihood the evidence would have affected the judgment of the
jury.68 As the Fifth Circuit stated, in Matthew v. Johnson,69
this standard of materiality indicates that the Brady rule was
meant to apply exclusively to exculpatory evidence withheld
during a trial, and not during the entry of a guilty plea. 70 In
Matthew, the defendant sought to have a plea of nolo
contendere for aggravated sexual assault of a minor set aside
after discovering that the assistant district attorney had
withheld documents in which the victim had at one point told
Child Protective Services that Matthew had not abused her.7 1
On appeal the Fifth Circuit refused to recognize the
prosecutor's failure to disclose this information as a
Brady violation. 72
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
Id.
67 21A AM JUR 2d § 1271 (West 1998).
68 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (citing Giglio v United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972».
69 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
70 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361-62.
71 Id. at 356-57. Before reaching the Fifth Circuit on appeal, the focus in the trial
court was whether Matthew had waived his right to assert a Brady claim after
pleading no contest. Id. at 356-68. Initially, the magistrate judge held that Matthew
had not waived his right to raise a Brady claim and "reasoned that the allegation that
the prosecution had withheld evidence, if true, would affect 'the very integrity of the
plea process.'" Id. at 356. Mter conducting an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate
applied the Sanchez standard of materiality and found that had Matthew possessed the
Brady evidence, he would not have pled no contest and would have insisted on going to
trial. Id. at 357. The magistrate's decision to vacate the plea, however, was
subsequently reversed on appeal to the district court, which found that Matthew had
"waived" his right to raise a Brady claim upon pleading no contest. Id. at 358.
72 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360-64.
65

66
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To support the conclusion that Brady was only meant to be
applied in the context of a trial, the Fifth Circuit focused on the
Brady rule's materiality standard. 73 The court noted several
United States Supreme Court decisions in which the
materiality standard had been framed in the context of trials. 74
In one such opinion, the court observed that the United States
Supreme Court had explicitly rejected U[a]n earlier argument
that the materiality test should be defined in terms of the
defendant's ability to prepare for trial ... ".75 Given the deeply
intertwined nature of the Brady rule with trials, the Fifth
Circuit held that no constitutional violation could occur where
there was no trial. 76 Thus, because Matthew had pled no
contest, waiving his right to a trial, the prosecutor had no duty
to disclose Brady evidence and no due process violation had
occurred. 77
Despite Matthew, however, some courts and Justices have
phrased the materiality standard broad enough to countenance
non-trial situations, including Brady claims that involve a
guilty plea. 78 For example, in Justice Blackmun's opinion in
[d. at 361.
[d. To support its position, the Fifth Circuit pointed to the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (discussing
the invalidity of convictions obtained at trial through deceptive means); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87·88 (1963) (discussing a prosecutor's duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence at trial); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) and
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (discussing disclosure of impeachment
evidence of government witnesses during trial); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
112 n.20 (1976) (rejecting as over broad a disclosure requirement that would
encompass pre-trial situations); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (framing the
Brady materiality requirement in the context of trials). [d.
75 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361.
The portion of Agurs to which the Fifth Circuit
referred stated that: "It has been argued that the [materiality] standard should focus
on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial,
rather than the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence. Such a
standard would be unacceptable ... [in part, because it] would necessarily encompass
incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the
prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense." Agurs, 427
U.S. at 112 n.20 (internal citations omitted); Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361.
76 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361.
77 [d. at 361-362.
78 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J).
It should be noted that a
significant debate has developed as to whether or not Brady s materiality requirement
makes the rule inherently inapplicable to plea bargaining and pre-plea discovery. See
e.g., John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001) (modification of the traditional materiality
requirement is necessary to apply Brady to plea bargaining); Daniel P. Blank, Plea
Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and
73

74
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Bagley, he announced a liberal materiality standard, stating
that "evidence is material . . . if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."79 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rehnquist supported Justice Blackmun's
standard of materiality stating that, Justice Blackmun's
standard of materiality "is 'sufficiently flexible' to cover all
instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable
to the accused. "80 This standard seemed to gain yet more
support by Justice Souter in Kyles v. Whitley81 and Justice
Stevens in Strickler v. Greene. 82 While Justice Stevens in
Strickler stated that for practical purposes, "there is never a
real 'Brady violation' unless the non-disclosure was so serious
that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed
evidence would have produced a different verdict," he also
stated that the term "Brady violation" has at times been used
to refer to "any breach of the broad obligation to disclose
exculpatoryevidence."83
Applying this broad standard to plea bargaining, the test
in a Brady claim arising out of a guilty plea would then be
whether the defendant would have pled differently had the
Brady information been available. 84 This was the standard
Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011 (2000) (Brady rule can apply to plea bargaining);
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HAsTINGS
L.J. 957 (1989) (same); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995)
(accused can raise a post-plea Brady claim); Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360
(2000) (accused cannot raise a post-plea Brady claim). See also supra note 67.
79 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 685.
81 514 U.S. 419, 437-40 (1995).
After quoting the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.11(a)(1993) and MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.8, Justice Souter stated that prosecutors alone can
know when evidence rises to the level requiring disclosure under Brady and thus bear
the burden of timely disclosure. Id. at 437-38. Recognizing that Brady and its progeny
impose a certain amount of leeway, and thus uncertainty, on when prosecutors must
act, Justice Souter concluded that prosecutors "anxious about tacking too close to the
wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence." Id. at 439 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at
108 ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."».
82
527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999).
83 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added).
84 John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437 (2001) stating that "If we apply the Brady-Bagley
standard literally to that proceeding and that result, the information is material if
there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the court would not have
accepted the plea." Id. at 473. This, however, Douglass asserts would create a
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applied by the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez u. United States. 85 In
Sanchez, the defendant sought to vacate his guilty plea for
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to
distribute after discovering that the party who supplied the
drugs and convinced him to plead guilty had been a sheriffs
informant. 86 Mter finding that Sanchez had not forfeited his
right to raise a Brady claim by pleading guilty, the court
focused on Brady s materiality standard. 87
While the Sanchez court recognized that the "usual"
standard of materiality focuses on Brady challenges in the
context of a trial, the court held that in cases in which the
defendant has pled guilty and then raises a Brady claim, the
standard is "whether there is a reasonable probability that but
for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant
would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial."88 In
further defining this standard, the court stressed that
Sanchez's simple assertion that he would have chosen to go to
trial had he been in possession of the undisclosed
Brady information, was inadequate. 89 Rather, the court held
that "the test for whether the defendant would have chosen to
go to trial is an objective one that centers on 'the likely
persuasiveness of the withheld information.'''90 Applying this
standard, the court found that it would not have been
objectively reasonable, given the lack of favorable evidence, for
Sanchez to go to trial and assert an entrapment defense
against the government. 91
"meaningless circle" as courts defined materiality in terms of whether the plea was
voluntarily and intelligent and would not accept a plea as voluntary and intelligent if
any material evidence was excluded. [d. Douglass points out that this could be
avoided, however, by shifting the courts focus so that "instead of assessing materiality
in relation to the adjudicated 'outcome' of the guilty plea 'proceeding'- that is the
courts acceptance of the plea - courts have shifted the focus to defendants' tactical
decision to plead guilty." Id. at 474-75.
85 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995).
86 [d. at 1450-51. Apparently the informant told Sanchez that if he pled guilty, the
informant would be able to insure that Sanchez's wife would not be prosecuted and he
would help Sanchez escape from prison. [d.
87 [d. at 1453-54.
See also infra text accompanying note 139 for the forfeiture
discussion in Sanchez.
88 50 F.3d at 1454.
89 [d.
90 [d. (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988».
91 50 F.3d at 1454. As is apparent, the circuit courts are sharply divided on what
standard to apply, as well as the equally significant issue of whether or not the Brady
rule is applicable to plea bargaining. See also supra note 78.
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B. GUILTY PLEAS

The guilty plea has become the most routine method by
which a criminal defendant is convicted in the American justice
system. 92 In fact, nearly ninety percent of all federal and state
convictions are the result of a guilty plea, usually involving
some form of plea agreement. 93 Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that, "[t]he state to some
degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important step in the
criminal process."94 There are several reasons why a defendant
may plead guilty, including: the defendant's respect for the
law; apprehension of the charge; threats made by the
government; accumulation of evidence against the defendant;
limiting liability to which the defendant himself is exposed; or
reducing the financial and emotional burden facing the
defendant or his family.95
Regardless of a defendant's motivation to plead guilty, "[a]
guilty plea is more than a confession which admits that the
accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing
remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."96 A
guilty plea "serves as a stipulation that no proof by the
prosecution need be advanced . . .. It supplies both evidence
and verdict, ending controversy."97 Because of the influence
the guilty plea has upon our criminal justice system, great
precautions are taken to ensure that a defendant's conviction
pursuant to a guilty plea is obtained in a constitutionally sound
manner.98 Thus, strict requirements have been established to
ensure that a defendant's guilty plea is entered both
voluntarily and intelligently.99

u.s.

92
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2001);
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, page 454.
93 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2001).
94 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). In Brady, the defendant on the
advice of counsel pleaded guilty to first degree murder later challenging the jury
selection as race-based. Id. at 743-44. This case should not to be confused with Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which announces the rule that exculpatory
information must be disclosed by the prosecution. Id. at 87.
95 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750. See also Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy
in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989) (proposing the possibility that
defendants enter into guilty pleas after inaccurately assessing the facts against them).
96 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
97 Id. at 242-43 nA.
98 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750-53.
99 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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1. Voluntary & Intelligent; Requirements of a Valid Guilty Plea

Among the mostly deeply rooted principles concerning
guilty pleas is that a defendant's guilty plea will only be
considered constitutionally valid when it is entered into
voluntarily and intelligently to the satisfaction of the court.100
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 101 explicitly
states that before the district court may accept a guilty plea, it
must first determine that the plea is voluntary.102 Rule 11
requires the court to address the defendant personally, rather
than through his lawyer, and to ensure the guilty plea is made
voluntarily, not under force or duress. 103 As part of this inquiry,
the court must inform the defendant of the rights he is waiving,
100 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (Defendant's conviction, by
way of guilty plea, for wilfully and knowingly evading tax payments was set aside on
the grounds that the district judge failed to determine directly from the defendant
himself whether the plea he was entering was voluntary and knowing).
101 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 states in pertinent part:
(c) Before accepting a guilty plea . . . the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the
defendant understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law . . . and the mandatory maximum possible penalty
provided by law including the effect of any special parole or supervised release
term, the fact that the court is required to consider any applicable sentencing
guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances, and,
when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant to make restitution
to any victim of the offense; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and, if
necessary, one will be appointed to represent the defendant; and
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if
it has already been and, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right
to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and the right against compelled self-incrimination; and
(4) that if a guilty plea ... is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial
or any kind, so that by pleading guilty ... the defendant waives his right to a
trial ...
(d) The court shall not accept a guilty plea ... without first, by addressing the
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and
not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The
court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty .
. . results from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and
the defendant or the defendant's attorney.
(f) Notwithstanding the acceptance of a guilty plea, the court should not enter a
judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that
there is a factual basis for the plea.
[d. (emphasis added).
102 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
103

[d.
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the rights he retains and the charges and possible
consequences he faces by pleading guilty. 104
In McCarthy v. United States,105 the United States
Supreme Court labored to ensure that Rule 11 was understood
and properly followed by the federal courts.l 06 In McCarthy,
after the district court judge briefly inquired of the defendant's
lawyer as to whether the defendant's plea was voluntary, the
court accepted the defendant's guilty plea to tax evasion. l07
During the sentencing, however, the defendant stated his
failure to file was "not deliberate," thus negating one of the
elements of the charge. lOB Subsequently, the defendant sought
to have his guilty plea withdrawn on the basis that the district
court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 11.109
In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court found
that the first error occurred when the district court failed to
address the defendant directly. 110 This is an important
requirement which enables the judge to get a better sense of
the defendant's actual willingness to enter the plea, in essence
exposing his state of mind and ensuring the creation of a more
complete record in the event the district court's determination
is subsequently attacked.l l1
In addition to ensuring a
voluntary plea in the sense that it is not coerced, the Court
held that the district court must also ensure that the defendant
"possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts."112 Thus, the district court must satisfactorily conclude
that the defendant is admitting to conduct which also
comprises the elements of the crime to which he is pleading
guilty. 113 Because the district court failed to inquire of the
defendant regarding the facts of the offense to which he was
admitting, the Court reversed the conviction. 114

104

Id.

105

394 U.S. 459 (1969).

106

Id. at 463.
Id. at 461.
Id.at 461-62.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 459.
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 471-72.

107

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
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2. Waivers, Guilty Pleas, and the Loss of Rights.
Generally, a guilty plea necessarily involves the waiver of
several important constitutional rights. 115 In addition, by
entering a guilty plea, a defendant also forfeits the right to
raise a broad range of legal and constitutional claims on
appeal. 116 For those rights which are not necessarily waived or
forfeited as the result of a guilty plea, a defendant may be able
to expressly waive others during a plea agreement in order to
obtain a more favorable sentence.1 17 While most rights are or
can be waived during the course of a guilty plea or plea
agreement,118 some rights cannot be waived at all, either by
pleading guilty or by agreeing to do so in a plea agreement,119
As can be seen from the several types of waivers that exist,
one commentator has noted that such a broad use of the word
"waiver" has led to considerable confusion as to what exactly
constitutes a waiver.120 Rather than trying to lump "waivers"
into one category in which they do not all fit, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Daniel Blank, has suggested that there are
116 Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating that "[sJeveral
constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a guilty plea is
entered .... First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination .... Second,
is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one's accusers.") (internal
citations omitted».
116 See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989).
See also Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-69 (1973).
117 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. See also United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843
(9th Cir. 1996) (defendants may generally agree to waive the right to appeal their
sentence); and Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 397 (1987) (defendants may agree to
waive the right to file a civil suit under 43 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking redress for
government violations of constitutional rights).
118
United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (holding that there is a
·presumption that legal rights generally . . . are subject to waiver by voluntary
agreement of the parties").
119 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (holding that "[tJhere may be some evidentiary
provisions that are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they
may never be waived without irrparably 'discredit[ingJ the federal courts'"). See
generally Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162 (1988) (a defendant may not waive
his right to conflict free counsel); United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a plea agreement cannot bar defendants from asserting "claims
involving a breach of the plea agreement, racial disparity in sentencing among
codefendants or an illegal sentence impose in excess of a maximum statutory penalty");
United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1992) (in which the court held the right
to a unanimous jury verdict can never be waived); United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d
1263 (9th Cir. 1997) (which provides for an unwaivable right to a speedy trial).
120 Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist s Guide
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2048 (2000).
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several types of waivers that must be evaluated before a court
can decide how a defendant's rights are or have been
extinguished. 121 It is sufficient here to recognize that when a
defendant pleads guilty: 1) most of his rights are either
automatically lost or forfeited; 2) some are withheld and may
bargain away at the defendant's discretion; and 3) a select few
are unwaivable. 122
a. Automatic Waiver of Rights after a Guilty Plea
One of the most significant and immediate consequences a
guilty plea imposes on the defendant who decides to admit to
guilt is the defendant's automatic loss of several constitutional
protections. 123 Mter a defendant admits in court that he as
committed a crime, not only is he subject to an inevitable
determination of punishment, but he also loses his right to
invoke the privilege against self· incrimination, request a jury
trial, or confront his accusers.124
Because of the dire
consequences and generally irreversible nature of a guilty plea,
courts must diligently ensure that the defendant understands
he is waiving these rights before accepting the guilty plea. 125
Failure to do so may otherwise result in an unconstitutional
and thus void plea. 126
b. Forfeiture of Rights
Not significantly different from automatic waivers, is a
defendant's loss of rights by forfeiture. 127 This type of waiver is
embodied by the United States Supreme Court's decision in

121 [d. at 2049-50. These types of waivers include: 1) the intentional relinquishment
of known rights; 2) the forfeiture of rights; 3) the loss of rights through the process of
election; and 4) the attempt to waive rights that are inalienable. [d.
122 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163-64.
123 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
124
[d. at 243.
125 [d.
126 [d. at 243-44.
127 See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). See also Robert K. Calhoun,
Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 131 (1995) ("in a series of
United States Supreme Court cases beginning with the Brady trilogy, and culminating
in Tollett v. Henderson, the Court has held that, by entering a guilty plea, a defendant
forfeits a broad range of potential legal and constitutional appellate claims that' would
otherwise have been available had the case gone to triaL").
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Tollett v. Henderson. 128 In Tollett, after pleading guilty to
murder, the defendant discovered that blacks had been
unconstitutionally excluded during the grand jury selection
and sought to have his guilty plea withdrawn on the basis that
his Fourteenth Amendment right to have a grand jury selected
in accordance with the constitution had been violated. 129
Since a waiver in the traditional sense required an
intentional relinquishment of a known right, the Court held
that the defendant could not have "waived" his right to
challenge the constitutionality of the grand jury because he
was unaware that such discrimination was occurring at the
time the grand jury was selected. 130 Nonetheless, the right had
been forfeited. 131
Following a line of cases which have
popularly become known as the Brady trilogy,132 the Court held
that:
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which
has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in
fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
entry of the guilty plea. 133
Thus, while the defendant had not waived his right to
challenge the constitutionality of the grand jury selection upon
pleading guilty, the Court found that because of the guilty plea,
the claim was lost, or forfeited. 134 In United States v. Broce, 135
the Court echoed its holding in Tollett and upheld the
defendants' guilty pleas despite their challenges that the

411 U.S. 258 (1973).
[d. at 259·60.
130 [d. at 266.
131 [d.
132 This Brady should not be confused with Brady v. Maryland in which the Brady
rule was set forth. The Brady Trilogy consists of: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); and Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970).
133 Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.
134 [d.
See also Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 131 n.18 (1995) ("the operative effect of Tollett and its progeny [is] the
'forfeiture' of appeal rights.").
135 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
128

129
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principle of double jeopardy had been violated. 136 In Broce, the
Court held that a "conscious waiver is [not] necessary with
respect to each potential defense relinquished by a guilty plea,"
instead, "[r]elinquishment derives . . . from the admissions
necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary guilty plea."137
Simply put, the Court stated that "[r]espondents had the
opportunity, instead of entering their guilty pleas, to challenge
the theory of the indictments ... in a trial-type proceeding. They
chose not to, and hence relinquished that entitlement."138
While Tollett and its progeny generally bar defendants
from raising antecedent constitutional claims, this rule is not
absolute. 139 The Ninth Circuit, is among the several circuits
that have carved out an exception to the Tollett rule. 140
Generally, this exception allows defendants to raise
constitutional challenges to alleged violations that precede
guilty pleas if the defendants entered these pleas without the
Id. at 565.
Id. at 573-74.
138 Id. at 571. This is the position the Eighth Circuit has taken on post-plea Brady
claims. In Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1989), the court summarily
held that a defendant, upon pleading guilty, waives any claim against the Government
for failure to disclose favorable Brady evidence. Id. at 657. From the Eight Circuit's
brief opinion, it appears that the court deemed the defendant to have forfeited his
claim against the Government for withholding Brady evidence based on the same
principles in Tollett, that a defendant is deemed to forfeit his right to raise an
antecedent constitutional claim after pleading guilty. See id.
139 See e.g. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 31 (1974) (holding that a violation of the
right not to be haled into court at all to answer a felony charge is not a claim of an
"antecedent constitutional violation" or a "deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of a guilty plea" that is barred by Tollett); Menna v. New
York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (holding that a double jeopardy claim was not waived
"where the state is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a
defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge
be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.").
140
See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995). See also White
v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Tollett line of cases
does not preclude a collateral attack upon a guilty plea based on a claimed Brady
violation.); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a guilty
plea entered absent Brady material is subject to collateral attack because it cannot be
intelligently and voluntarily entered); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th
Cir. 1985) (stating that the Supreme Court in Tollett and the Brady trilogy did not
intend to insulate all misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny
solely because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes
constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent."); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d
491, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that under certain limited circumstances, a
Brady violation can render a defendant's plea involuntary, thus a defendant who has
pleaded guilty is not automatically barred from claiming later that the prosecution
withheld material evidence).
136

137
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necessary disclosure of Brady evidence by the prosecution. 141
The Ninth Circuit adopted this exception in Sanchez v. United
States, in which the defendant sought to vacate his guilty plea
after learning that the Government allegedly suppressed
impeachment evidence.l 42
The court reasoned that this
exception was warranted because defendants, without having
access to exculpatory Brady evidence, could not appropriately
assess the prosecution's case.l 43 Thus, they could not enter
constitutionally sound voluntary and intelligent guilty pleas. 144
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez could not
have waived his right to raise a Brady claim after pleading
guilty because "[a] waiver cannot be deemed 'intelligent and
voluntary' if 'entered without knowledge of material
information withheld by the prosecution."'145 Ultimately the
driving force behind the adoption of this exception was the
courts concern that if defendants were barred from raising
Brady claims after pleading guilty, "prosecutors may be
tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory information as
part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas."146

See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453.
See id. Specifically, Sanchez alleged that the Government failed to disclose the
fact that two "friends" that had visited Sanchez in jail and counseled him to plead
guilty were also Government informants. Id. at 1450. Apparently these informants
(whom Sanchez believed to be his friends) told Sanchez that if he pled guilty they
would be able to secure his release through contacts they had in Washington D.C. and
that his wife would not be indicted. Id. at 1451. See also supra text accompanying
note 85 for a discussion of Brady's materiality standard as applied by the Ninth Circuit
in Sanchez.
143 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453.
144 See id.
145 See id. (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988».
146 Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. The Fifth Circuit has taken a different view of this
issue, however. In Matthew u. Johnson, the court concluded that when a defendant
enters guilty plea, it is not involuntary or unintelligent if the prosecutor withholds
material Brady evidence because courts do not need this information to accept a guilty
plea. 201 F.3d at 364·69. Further, the court categorized as "weak" the argument that,
because defendant's often rely on an assessment of the prosecutions case in pleading
guilty, voluntary and intelligent plea cannot be entered absent Brady material. Id. at
368·69. The court stated that defendants often enter guilty pleas with incomplete or
inaccurate information and even with exculpatory Brady material, the defendant
would still only be provided with "part of the picture"; in reality, the court stated, the
defendant would need both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence to be able to enter a
plea voluntarily and intelligently under this reasoning. Id. However, the United
States Supreme court' has held that such disclosure is not required. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire
file to defense counsel. .. .").
141

142

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4

22

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:1

c. Voluntary and Intentional Waiver of Rights Mter Pleading
Guilty
Despite the fact that a guilty plea operates as an automatic
waiver of the three rights enumerated in Boykin and the
forfeiture of a wide-range of other constitutional rights, a
defendant who enters a guilty plea is not totally without
rights. 147 It is not uncommon for the government to bargain for
the waiver of these retained rights. 148 When it does so the
defendant is being asked to make the type of waiver
contemplated by the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst. 149 These
waivers involve the "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege" by the
defendant. 15o As to these waivers, the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that "[a] criminal defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution."151 In
addition, unless otherwise proscribed by a showing of
congressional intent, a defendant may also waive many
statutory protections. 152
For example, in United States v. Mezzanatto,153 the United
States Supreme Court held very broadly in favor of allowing a
defendant the ability to waive normally protected rights in
exchange for leverage with the prosecutor. 1M In Mezzanatto,
the defendant approached the prosecution hoping to cooperate
after being arrested for possession with intent to distribute

147 Interview with Robert K. Calhoun, Professor, Golden Gate University School of
Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (November 12, 2001). See also supra text accompanying
note 124.
148 Id.
See also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal
Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011,
2057 (2000) (stating that "[mlany criminal waivers, particularly but not exclusively
those associated with plea bargains, occur during a negotiation with the government.").
149 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
160 Id. at 464.
151 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 201 (1995).
See e.g., Ricketts v.
Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (a defendant can waive double jeopardy defense by
pretrial agreement); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (a defendant may
knowingly and voluntarily waive there Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
152 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201 (a defendant may waive the protections granted to
him under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which prohibits
prosecutors from introducing plea negotiation statements into evidence during trial).
153 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
154 Id. at 210.
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methamphetamine. 155 The prosecution agreed to speak with
the defendant, but only if the defendant agreed to waive his
right to have statements made during the course of the plea
negotiations excluded from evidence, in the event that the case
went to trial.1 56 To the defendant's detriment, he agreed to this
condition. 157
As the defendant conveyed his story, the
Government
discovered
inconsistencies
between
the
defendant's statements and surveillance evidence they had in
their possession and ended the meeting. 158 Subsequently,
during the defendant's trial, the Government attempted to
introduce the defendant's inconsistent statements into
evidence. 159
The defendant objected, arguing that statements made
during the course of plea agreements that do not result in a
guilty plea, are inadmissable at trial. 160 The trial court allowed
the evidence and the jury returned with a guilty verdict. 161 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's waiver was
invalid because Congress had not expressed otherwise,
therefore, the trial judge should not have admitted the
statements at trial.1 62 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling, arguing that U[r]ather than
deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of
express enabling clause, we instead have adhered to the
opposite presumption."163 The Court went on to assert that "[a]
criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many
of the most fundamental protections afforded by the
Constitution." 164
Indeed, the Court argued that "[t]he
presumption of waivability has found specific application in the
context of evidentiary rules" where "evidentiary stipulations
are a valuable and integral part of everyday trial practice."165

166
166
167
168
169
160
161
162
163
164
166

[d. at 198.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 199.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199.
[d. See also FED. R. EVID. 410.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 199.
[d. at 200.
[d. at 200·01.
[d. at 201.
[d. at 202·03
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d. Unwaivable Rights
Finally, some rights have been deemed so sacrosanct that a
defendant may never waive or lose them as the result of a
guilty plea or during plea negotiations. 166 As the Seventh
Circuit comically stated, "[even] if the parties stipulated to trial
by 12 orangutans the defendant's conviction would be invalid
notwithstanding his consent, because some minimum of
civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless
of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept."167 On a
more serious note, the United States Supreme Court has found
that "[t]here may be some evidentiary provisions that are so
fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that
they may never be waived without irreparably 'discredit[ing]
the federal courts."'168
One such right that the Court has refused to allow a
defendant to waive is the right to conflict-free counsel in a
criminal proceeding.1 69 The defendant in Wheat v. United
States 170 attempted such a waiver and challenged his drug
conviction on the grounds that the court refused to allow him to
waive his right to conflict-free counsel.171 The defendant
argued that all potential problems could have been avoided by
a waiver of this right.1 72 The United States Supreme Court,
however, held that the problem was not that simple. The Court
held that "[f]ederal courts have an independent interest in
ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear
fair to all who observe them."173 These interests, the Court
feared, would be jeopardized if such waivers were regularly
permitted. 174 Thus, the Court held that because it was likely
that a conflict of interest would be created by multiple

Id. at 204.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (citing United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588
(7th Cir. 1985».
168
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (quoting 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5039 (1977».
169 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1988).
170 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
171 Id. at 157.
172 Id. at 160.
173 Id.
166

167

174

Id.
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representation, denial of the defendant's waIver was
justified. 175
While it appears that no specific formula has been used to
determine which rights cannot be waived, as can be seen from
the Court's decision in Wheat, when the integrity of the court
and its processes are themselves endangered, waivers have not
been accepted. 176
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
In United States v. Ruiz,177 the defendant challenged the
"fast track" plea agreement used by the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of California, which required the
defendant to waive certain Brady rights on the ground that it
violated the defendant's right to due process. 17S The court
articulated the issues as: 1) whether the right to Brady
information could constitutionally be waived in a plea
agreement, and 2) whether the benefits of a plea agreement
could be conditioned on the defendant's waiver of her right to
Brady material. I79
But before addressing the merits of Ruiz's appeal, the
Government challenged the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
Specifically, the Government argued that Ruiz's denial of the
"fast track" plea agreement and her subsequent unconditional
guilty plea extinguished any antecedent constitutional
challenges she may have had. ISO
A. JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE .

The Government first attacked Ruiz's appeal on the
grounds that the Government's refusal to recommend, and the
Id. at 164.
See e.g. United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1992) (The court refused
to allow a defendant to waive his right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act
because the waiver would obviate the societal interest of speedy justice).
177 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001).
178 Id. at 1161.
179 Id.
The court stated that, "[s]pecifically, Ruiz contends that: (1) the right to
receive undisclosed Brady evidence is not subject to waiver through plea agreements,
(2) prosecutors cannot withhold a 'fast track' recommendation simply because a
defendant declines to waive her Brady rights, and (3) the Government here withheld
the 'fast track' recommendation for this reason." Id. at 1163.
ISO [d. at 1161-63.
175

176
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sentencing judge's refusal to grant, Ruiz's request for a
downward departure was not reviewable by the Ninth
Circuit. 181 Generally, a defendant does not have the right to
appeal a district court's discretionary denial of a defendant's
request for a downward departure from the applicable
sentencing guidelines.1 82 The application of this rule, however,
is limited to cases in which the sentencing judge actually
exercises his discretion not to depart from the sentencing
guidelines.1 83 The majority, however, did not argue that the
sentencing judge refused to exercise any discretion. 184 Rather,
the majority interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)185 as granting
jurisdiction to appellate courts to review constitutional
challenges to the sentence imposed. 186 Thus, the majority
asserted that the court had jurisdiction over Ruiz's
constitutional challenge to the sentencing process itself.187
The majority then rejected two arguments proposed by the
Government. 188 First, the Government argued that by pleading
guilty, Ruiz forfeited her right to challenge the
constitutionality of the Brady waiver.1 89 Citing United States
v. Broce,190 the Government took the position that, Ruiz's right
to challenge any constitutional defects that preceded the guilty
plea was extinguished after she refused to accept the original
"fast track" plea agreement and subsequently entered an
181

[d. at 1161.

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1161. United States v. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 102 (9th Cir.
1990). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3742 which reads in pertinent part: "(a) A defendant
may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence
182

if the sentence: (1) was imposed in violation of law (2) was imposed as a result of an
incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines."
183 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162.
184 See id. at 1162. See also United States v. Khoury, 62 F.3d 1138, 1140·42 (9th Cir.
1995), in which the Ninth Circuit held that where the Government impermissibly
withholds a recommendation for a downward departure, the district court may still
exercise its own discretion to grant the downward departure. Id. at 1141
185 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) states that a sentence is reviewable on appeal if it "was
imposed in violation oflaw."
186 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162.
Other circuits have also adopted this reading of 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(I) including the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Senn, 102 F.3d
327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996); the Third Circuit in United States v. Graham, 72 F.3d 352,
358 n.S (3d Cir. 1995); the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Holmes, 60 F.3d 1134,
1137 (4th Cir. 1995); and the First Circuit in United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55 (1st
Cir. 1991).
187 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1162.
188 [d. at 1163.
189 [d.
190 488 U.S. 563 (1989).
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unconditional guilty plea. 191 Simply put, the court could not
review the constitutional defect alleged by Ruiz because it
would have occurred prior to her entering the guilty plea. 192
And after pleading guilty her right to raise the claim would
have been waived or forfeited. 193
The majority, however, held that Ruiz's appeal challenged
the constitutionality of the Government's actions after she pled
guilty (i.e. by refusing to recommend a downward departure at
the sentencing hearing) and not before the guilty plea as the
Government contended. 194 Thus, Ruiz had not waived or
forfeited the right to raise this constitutional claim.195
The second argument proposed by the Government rested
on a contractual theory.196 The Government argued that it
was under no obligation to recommend a downward departure
because Ruiz had rejected the original "fast track" plea
agreement present in the original offer.1 97
Thus, the
Government argued that there was no agreement for the Ninth
Circuit to enforce. 19B
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the grounds
that Ruiz was not attempting to enforce the "fast track" plea
agreement. 199 To the contrary, the majority announced that
Ruiz's claim focused on the constitutionality of the
Government's refusal to recommend the downward departure
based on her unwillingness to waive her Brady rights in return
for the recommendation. 20o Accordingly, a majority of the
Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review Ruiz's
constitutional claim and proceeded to decide the case on the
merits. 201

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163.
Id.
193 Id.
The dissent also argued that the unconstitutional conduct, if any, existed
prior to the sentencing during the plea agreement when the Government asked for the
Brady waiver. Id. at 1176 (Tallman, J. dissenting).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201
See id.
191

192
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B. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO
RECOMMEND THE "FAST TRACK" DEPARTURE

Ruiz argued that the Government unconstitutionally
withheld the "fast track" recommendation because she refused
to waive her right to receive Brady evidence. 202 In framing the
issue, the court stated that the heart of Ruiz's argument was
that the right to receive Brady evidence could not
constitutionally be subject to waIver through plea
agreements. 203
1. Unconstitutionality of Brady Waivers

a. Guilty Plea Waivers Generally
In laying the foundation for its opinion, the Ninth Circuit
first addressed the validity of a Brady waiver by examining the
general consequences that a guilty plea has on a defendant's
constitutional rights. 204 Generally, the court stated, a guilty
plea has one of three effects on a defendant's constitutional
rights.205 First, by pleading guilty, a defendant automatically
waives several constitutional rights.206 Second, the defendant
may have the option of expressly waiving those rights not
automatically lost by a guilty plea as part of a plea
agreement. 207 Finally, the Ninth Circuit recognized a category
of constitutional rights that could never be waived as the result
of a guilty plea or as part of a plea agreement. 208 Ruiz argued,
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1163.
Id.
204 ld.
205 ld. at 1163·64.
206 ld. at 1163. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding
that the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right to
invoke the privilege against self· incrimination were among those rights which a
defendant automatically waived upon entering a guilty plea). See also United States v.
Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573·74 (1989) (stating that an unconditional guilty plea generally
results in the automatic waiver of the right to challenge any constitutional defects
which preceded the guilty plea).
207 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. See also supra text accompanying note 115.
208 ld. See United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a plea agreement cannot bar defendants from asserting "claims involving a breach
of the plea agreement, racial disparity in sentencing among codefendants or an illegal
sentence impose in excess of a maximum statutory penalty."). See also United States v.
Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1992) (in which the court held the right a unanimous
jury verdict can never be waived). See also United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d 1263, 1268
202

203
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and a majority of the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the right to
receive Brady material fell within the third category, as a right
which could never be waived as the result or during the course
of a plea agreement. 209
b. Invalidating the Voluntary and Intelligent Guilty Plea
Focusing on the concepts that comprise a valid guilty plea,
Ruiz argued that the waiver of the right to receive Brady
information, as required by the "fast track" plea agreement,
was unconstitutional because a defendant could not voluntarily
and intelligently waive her right to receive Brady evidence. 21o
The Ninth Circuit, never having previously addressed
defendants' right to receive Brady material in the context of
plea agreements, analogized Ruiz's case to Sanchez v. United
States. 211 There the Ninth Circuit had held that defendants
could not voluntarily and intelligently enter guilty pleas
without Brady evidence, nor could they waive or be deemed to
have forfeited, upon pleading guilty, the right to raise a Brady
claim that preceded the guilty plea. 212
In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit extended Sanchez to apply not
only to a guilty plea entered by the defendant, but also to plea
agreements themselves. 213 The Ruiz court held that in light of
its earlier decision in Sanchez, Brady rights are not
automatically waived by the entry of a guilty plea. 214
Accordingly, the court had to resolve whether a defendant's
right to receive Brady evidence could either be expressly
(9th Cir. 1997) (which provides for an unwaivable right to a speedy trial).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1163.
See also supra note 8 for the "Fast Track" plea agreement
Brady waiver in Ruiz.
211
50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995); Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. The Ruiz court pointed out
that no court had ever addressed the issue as to whether Brady rights could be waived
in a plea agreement. Id. In Sanchez, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy and
intent to distribute cocaine. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1450. Sanchez argued that his guilty
plea should be revoked because the Government had committed a Brady violation by
failing to disclose that two "friends· who had visited Sanchez in jail and counseled him
to plead guilty were also Government informants. Id. at 1451. Apparently the
informants (who Sanchez believed to be friends) told Sanchez that if he pled guilty they
would be able to secure his release through contacts they had in Washington D.C. and
that his wife would not be indicted. Id.
212 See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. See also supra text accompanying note 139 for a
thorough discussion of the forfeiture issue in Sanchez.
213 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164.
214 Id.
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waived by the defendant in a plea agreement or whether the
right to receive Brady evidence was a right that could not be
waived at all. 215
Focusing on the voluntary and intelligent requirements of
a valid guilty plea, the court stated that "plea agreements, like
guilty pleas, must be entered into voluntarily and intelligently
to satisfy due process requirements."216 The pre-plea disclosure
of Brady evidence, the court continued, plays an important role
in the defendant's assessment of the prosecution's case and
decision whether to plead guilty.217 In addition, such disclosure
ensures that the prosecution does not deliberately suppress
exculpatory information to achieve a conviction. 218 Thus, the
court concluded that "plea agreements, and any waiver of
Brady rights contained therein, 'cannot be deemed intelligent
and voluntary if entered without knowledge of material
information withheld by the prosecution.'" The court reasoned
that, if the need for Brady material is crucial during a guilty
plea in order to both ensure the defendant is making the proper
decision and the prosecutor is not suppressing information as
in Sanchez, then the need for Brady material is as equally
important during a plea agreement. 219
To overcome the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Sanchez, the
Government attempted to distinguish defendants' waiver of
rights during the entry of plea agreements with defendants'
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996».
217 Ruiz 241 F.3d at 1164.
218 Id.
219 Id.
The Ninth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion in Ruiz, analogized its
reasoning with the court's analysis in DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir.
2000). In DeRoo, the plea agreement included a waiver of ineffective assistance of
council claims. Id. at 923-24. The challenge to the waiver was that it prevented the
defendant from entering a plea agreement voluntarily and· intelligently. Id. The
Eighth Circuit held that a "decision to enter into a plea agreement cannot be knowing
and voluntary when the plea agreement itself is the result of advice outside the range
of competence .... " Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that ·'fj]ustice dictates that
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of [a plea]
agreement cannot be barred by the agreement - the very product of the alleged
ineffectiveness.'" Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir.
1999». With this holding the Eighth Circuit effectively barred waivers of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims associated with the negotiation of plea agreements. See
DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923-24. For similar propositions, the Ruiz court also pointed to:
United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Henderson, 72 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 1995); and United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175 (4th
Cir. 1993).
215
216
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waiver of rights during the entry of guilty pleas. 22o The
Government asserted that the situations were distinct because
in a plea agreement a defendant is aware of the rights being
waived, while in the entry of a guilty plea a defendant would
not be aware. 221 As such, the Government contended that
Ruiz's waiver of her right to impeachment evidence during the
course of her plea agreement did not violate the voluntary and
intelligent requirement. 222
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because in
Sanchez it was not the Government's failure to disclose the
existence of the right to receive Brady material that rendered
the guilty plea involuntary and unintelligent. 223 Rather, it was
the Government's failure to produce the actual Brady evidence
that gave validity to the defendant's claim. 224 Similarly, in
Ruiz's case, the court held that "a defendant's abstract
awareness of her rights under Brady is a pale substitute for the
receipt of concrete Brady material."225 The court reasoned, that
with the actual Brady material, the defendant would be in a
much better position to make a voluntary and intelligent choice
about entering a guilty plea. 226 Without such information, a
guilty plea could not be voluntary and intelligent and therefore
valid. 227 In this way, the court concluded that a defendant's
right to receive Brady evidence could not be constitutionally
waived through a plea agreement. 228
c. Protecting a Defendant's Right to Impeachment Evidence
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the Government's
argument that, while the waiver of all Brady rights may not be
constitutional, the waiver at issue in the "fast track" agreement
was not unconstitutional because it required that Ruiz waive
only some Brady rights, specifically her right to receive

220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1165.
Id.
Id.
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impeachment evidence of Government witnesses. 229 Because
the case would never proceed to trial, as a result of Ruiz guilty
plea, the Government argued that impeachment evidence was
irrelevant at the pretrial plea bargain stage. 230
On the contrary, the court could find nothing to suggest
that Sanchez s holding only required prosecutors to produce
exculpatory evidence and not impeachment evidence before the
entry of a guilty plea. 231 In fact, the court indicated that the
opposite was true, noting that "[t]he Brady rule encompasses
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence."232 The
court stated the United States Supreme Court "declined to
recognize any meaningful difference between these two types of
Brady evidence."233 Rather, the court found that a reasonable
interpretation of Sanchez was much broader, requiring
prosecutors to disclose both impeachment and exculpatory
evidence before the defendant entered a guilty plea. 234
The court reiterated that according to the Brady rule, the
Government is required to disclose evidence that is "favorable
to the defendant if it is 'material."'235 In the context of Ruiz's
case, the Ninth Circuit found that "evidence is 'material' if
'there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to
disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have refused
to plead and would have gone to trial."'236 Thus, the court held
that impeachment evidence is 'material' because the disclosure
of such evidence could "create a reasonable probability the
defendant would reject the plea agreement."237
The court also held that prosecutors must disclose Brady
material at a time when the information will be of value to the
accused. 238 In the context of plea agreements, this would be
before a defendant accepted the plea agreement. 239
229 [d. at 1165-66.
See also supra note 8 for the "Fast Track" plea agreement
Brady waiver in Ruiz.
230 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166.

231

[d.

232

236

[d. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676).
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-77).
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166.
[d. (citing Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453).
[d. (quoting Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454).

237

[d.

238

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166 (citing United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th

233

234
235

Cir. 1988».
239

Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166-67. The court went on to state that, "[t]his does not mean,
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Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's duty
to disclose impeachment evidence could not be separated from
its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and such disclosure
was required before the accused entered into a plea
agreement. 240

2. Conditioning the ''Fast Track Plea Agreement on an
Unconstitutional Brady Waiver
IJ

Finally, Ruiz contended that the Government acted with'
an unconstitutional motive when it opposed her request for the
downward departure based simply on the fact that she would
not accept what she believed to be an unconstitutional Brady
waiver. 241 The Government, on the other hand, asserted that it
was not improper to condition Ruiz's plea agreement on the
waiver of her Brady rights because she was never obligated to
accept the agreement.242 Before addressing Ruiz's argument,
the court discussed whether it would be permissible for the
Government to refuse to recommend a downward departure
present in a plea agreement that the defendant rejected
because it contained an unconstitutional waiver of that
defendant's rights.243
In discussing this issue, the court recognized that is not
unconstitutional for prosecutors to encourage defendants to
forego constitutionally protected rights through incentives. 244
The court pointed out, however, that this rule "is premised on
the assumption that the targeted rights may be validly
waived."245 Contrary to the rule, the court had found that the
right to receive undisclosed Brady material could not be
constitutionally waived without violating the Due Process
requirement that a defendant's plea be voluntary and
intelligent. 246
Accordingly, the court concluded that the
as the Government contends, that impeachment evidence is only valuable if there is
going to be a trial. It simply means that, if there is going to be a trial, impeachment
evidence, like exculpatory evidence, must be disclosed while it is still valuable." [d.
240 [d. at 1167.
241 [d.
242
243
244

Id.
Id.
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1167 (quoting United States v. Villasenor-Cesar, 114 F.3d 970,

975 (9th Cir. 1997».
245 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1167.
246 [d. at 1167-68.
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Government could not constitutionally withhold a downward
departure recommendation based on a defendant's refusal to
accept a Brady waiver.247
As to Ruiz's argument that the Government acted with an
unconstitutional motive, the court stated that it would indeed
have been impermissible for the Government to oppose the
downward departure simply because Ruiz refused to waive her
Brady rights. 248 To prove such a motive existed, Ruiz had to
make a "substantial threshold showing" by producing evidence
that the Government acted in such a manner. 249 In finding
that Ruiz had satisfied her burden, the court pointed to the fact
that Ruiz had consistently represented that she refused to
accept the "fast track" plea agreement because she would have
had to waive her Brady rights.250 This, coupled with the fact
that the Government refused to recommend the downward
departure because no plea agreement obligated it to do so,
compelled the court to order an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the Government impermissibly withheld
the departure because Ruiz refused to accept the
unconstitutional Brady waiver. 251

C. JUDGE TALLMAN'S DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tallman set forth a
lengthy discussion agreeing with the Government's contention
that the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider the issues
in this case. 252 Upon evaluating the Brady issue, Judge
Tallman stated that he feared the negative policy implications
the majority's holding would have on the processing of criminal
cases in an overloaded system. 253 Judge Tallman argued that
the obligatory disclosure of impeachment evidence to an
accused as early as the plea bargaining stage would be both
useless to the defendant so early on and would damage the
[d. at 1168.
See [d. at 1167 (citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185·86 (1992) and
United States v. Treleaven, 35 F.3d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1994».
249 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1168.
250 [d.
251 [d. at 1168·69. The United States Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in
Ruiz. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 803 (2002).
252 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1172.
253
[d. at 11 76.
247

248
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prosecution's case in the future. 254 In the event of a trial,
Judge Tallman argued that early disclosure could be
problematic, "for example, if the government were required to
publicly release information on the identity of an informant
that it would like to keep confidential as long as possible."255
Ultimately, Judge Tallman objected to the rule established
by the majority's opinion because it would likely dissolve the
"fast track" program that had been operating so successfully.256
Judge Tallman argued that if mandatory disclosure was
required in all cases, even those that did not proceed to trial,
an already over-worked system would become even more
congested as prosecutors scrambled to disclose evidence that
would only be useful at trial not during the plea agreement
process. 257

D. JunGE TASHIMA'S CONOURRING OPINION
Judge Tashima wrote a concurring opinion primarily to
respond to Judge Tallman's argument that jurisdiction was
improper. 258 Judge Tashima, also addressed Judge Tallman's
concern that the majority's ruling would have negative policy
implications. 259 Judge Tashima stated that while the Southern
District of California had a heavy caseload, the court's ruling
declaring impeachment waivers unconstitutional would not
undermine the effectiveness of the "fast track" program. 260 He
argued that in simple cases, such as Ruiz's, the Government
would be faced with very few, if any, Government witnesses,
and thus would have to disclose very little impeachment
evidence. 261 Thus, Judge Tashima argued that Judge Tallman
had no reason to be concerned that the Government's Brady
obligations would become overwhelming. 262 Even assuming the
court's ruling did create a "caseload crisis," Judge Tashima
emphasized that the appropriate solution would be for
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1176·77.
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1169·70.
Id. at 1170·71.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Id.
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Congress to authorize more judgeships, not for the court to
"shortcut the Constitution."263
V. CRITIQUE

A. PRESERVING THE TRUTH-SEEKING FUNCTION: THE NEED
FOR PRE-TRIAL BRADY DISCLOSURES

Possibly the most important aspect of the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Ruiz, is that it seeks to preserve the truth-seeking
function of the courts and the criminal justice system in
general. Since its decision in Brady v. Maryland, the United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that the driving
force behind requiring the prosecution to disclose exculpatory
and impeachment evidence during plea negotiations is to
ensure that "justice is done its citizens in the courts."264 In the
same spirit, the Court has historically recognized that it is the
role of the courts and prosecutors to ascertain the truth when a
person is accused of a crime, not simply to obtain a
conviction. 265
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's holding seems to conflict
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mezzanatto. 266 In Mezzanatto, the Court expressed the view
that criminal defendants are presumptively free to waive most
of their fundamental rights, especially those granting them
protection under the rules of evidence. 267 In this way the
Brady discovery rule is similar to the rules of evidence because
of its focus on trial procedure. Thus, it could be argued under
Mezzanatto that the Brady rule IS a right which is
Id. at 1170.
See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110-11 ("For though the
attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he
must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done'");
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 (1995) ("[Brady] disclosures will serve to justify
trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ...
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.'"
(citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935».
265 See Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 204 (admitting plea statements for impeachment
purposes because it enhances the truth-seeking function of trials); Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) (it is the function of the courts of justice to ascertain
the truth); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 (discussing the role of courts and prosecutors in
ensuring that the truth is found when a person is accused of a crime).
266 See also supra text accompanying note 153.
267 Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 200-03. See also supra text accompanying note 153.
263
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presumptively waiveable. In Mezzanatto, however, it was
relatively simple for the Court to conclude that defendants can
constitutionally waive their right to have plea statements
excluded during trial, especially since such a waiver would
result in the production of more information for a jury to use
during deliberation. 26B
Contrary to the waiver at issue in Mezzanatto, the purpose
of the "fast track" waiver in Ruiz was not to produce more
information thereby leading. to a more accurate or informed
plea by the defendant. 269 Rather, the purpose of the waiver in
Ruiz was to exclude as much information as constitutionally
permissible. 270 It was not designed to ensure that the truth
was found or that justice was achieved. Instead, as Judge
Tallman's dissent points out, the waiver was included in plea
agreements to speed cases through the court's docket, thereby
unclogging an already overburdened judicial system. 271
While the idea of creating an efficient criminal justice
system is appealing, the manner in which this goal is achieved
through the "fast track" agreement is problematic. 272
Requiring Brady waivers in plea agreements can ultimately
only diminish the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice
system by relieving prosecutors of their duty to disclose the
most valuable information to an accused at the most valuable
point in time.
Instead of pushing uninformed criminal
defendants through a congested system because it is too costly
to provide them with impeachment evidence, the Ninth Circuit
properly held in Ruiz that it is unconstitutional to deprive
defendants of Brady information. This is so whether or not
they are willing to waive their right to receive this information.
To preserve the truth-seeking nature of our criminal justice
[d. at 204. See also supra text accompanying note 153.
Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1165·66.
270 See id. The Government, in order to win over a majority of the Ninth Circuit,
argued that they weren't trying to deprive Ruiz of all her Brady rights, just some of
them. [d.
271 [d. at 1176·77 (Tallman, J. dissenting). Judge Tallman noted that "[t]hrough the
fast track program the [Southern] District [of California] has been able to dramatically
expedite the processing of its heavy workload." [d.
272 See [d. at 1170·71 (Tashima, J. concurring). Judge Tashima states that
"[i]ncreased prosecutorial efficiency is a commendable goal, but it surely should not be
advanced at the cost of requiring the accused to give up an unwaivable constitutional
right. The appropriate solution ... is for Congress to authorize more judgeships, not to
shortcut the Constitution." Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1170·71 (Tashima, J. concurring).
268
269
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system as a whole, and not just at trials, it is important that
Brady evidence be strictly guarded.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ruiz has placed the
right to receive Brady evidence among those "rare
constitutional rights that cannot be waived ... ".273 In doing so,
the court has protected an accused's right to receive
exculpatory and impeachment evidence that the Government
has in its possession at a time when the disclosure of such
evidence would be of "value" - here, before the acceptance of a
plea agreement. 274
As several courts have noted, a defendant's decision
whether to plead guilty rests heavily on his assessment of the
prosecution's case. 275 Mter the Ninth Circuit's holding in Ruiz,
those accused of a crime are now in a much better position to
evaluate the weight of material evidence in their favor and
then make a decision as to how they will proceed. 276 Without
the disclosure of Brady information at plea bargaining stage of
criminal proceedings, the inducement of guilty pleas from those
who have possibly been falsely or mistakenly accused could
become a common reality.277 Further, if a guilty plea did result
in waiver or forfeiture of the right to raise a Brady claim, such
a rule would apply across the board. As one commentator
noted, regardless of whether a prosecutor wrongfully
suppresses Brady evidence to induce a guilty plea, fails to
disclose evidence it should have reasonably been aware of
before the guilty plea was entered, or did not discover the
evidence until after the guilty plea was entered, the result is
the same - the defendant would be barred from raising a Brady
claim. 278 In short, a defendant who pled guilty would be
[d. at 1172.
[d. at 1166-67.
275 See e.g., Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164; Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453; Miller, 848 F.2d at
1320; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756.
276 It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit's position in Matthew regarding this idea
was over broad. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ruiz does nothing to change the rule
that prosecutors are only required to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence
and not incriminating evidence. Thus, under the Ruiz line of reasoning, prosecutors
are not required to turn over their entire case file to an accused, but only material
evidence regarding the accused's innocence.
277 See, Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 968-84 (1989). For an argument that such fears are unwarranted,
see, John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 499-501 (2001).
278
Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist S Guide
273
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helpless to challenge his plea if exculpatory evidence was later
discovered, regardless of whether the evidence was wrongfully
suppressed or innocently overlooked by the prosecution.
Not all courts agree with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Ruiz. There is a a sharp divide between those circuits who
would follow the Ninth Circuits opinion and those who would
oppose it.279 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Matthew u. Johnson
is an example. 280 Up to now, however, the debate has focused
less on the truth-seeking aspect of pre-trial Brady disclosures
and more on the technical applicability of Brady in the pre-trial
context. 281 In focusing on Brady's application to the pre-trial
stages of the criminal process, the value of Ruiz is best
illustrated when compared with the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Matthew.
B. DEFENDING RUIZ AGAINST MAITHEW

As mentioned, the Ruiz court found the reasoning
underlying the Brady rule to be applicable at the plea
bargaining stage of criminal proceedings. In contrast, the Fifth
Circuit in Matthew argued that the Brady rule was meant only
to apply to trials, thus implying that an accused is not entitled
to be treated fairly during any other stage of the criminal
process. 282 The Matthew court went so far as to state that
Bradyevidence is not necessary to protect the due process
rights of those who plead guilty.283
The Fifth Circuit's position is in dirct conflict with the
Court's reasoning in Brady that U[s]ociety wins not only when
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 2011, 2060 (2000).
279 See e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (guilty plea not
knowing and intelligent if entered without knowledge of exculpatory Brady material);
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Campbell v.
Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985) (same); White v. United States, 858 F.2d
416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988) (same). But cf Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th
Cir. 1989) (in pleading guilty defendant waives all challenges to the prosecution);
Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361, 364-69 (5th Cir. 2000) (in the absence of a trial
no Brady violation can occur and plea not involuntary or unintelligent without Brady
evidence). For this reason it is likely that the United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to Ruiz. See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct 803 (2002).
280
201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
281
See also supra note 78.
282 See also supra note 146.
283 Matthew, 201 F.3d at 362 n.13.
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system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly."284 It is abundantly clear from this
statement that the Court was not limiting an accused's right to
be treated fairly to trials alone, as the Fifth Circuit would
suggest. Rather, the Court's statement in Brady indicates that
any time an accused is treated unfairly, justice suffers.
Withholding exculpatory information from an accused as he
struggles to decide whether to take an attractive deal and
spend time in prison, or go to trial and take his chance based
on the limited evidence he is aware of, is not justice. Such a
rule would more likely lead to a number of wrongful
convictions. As the United States Supreme Court has acutely
pointed out, "concern about the injustice that results from the
conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of
our criminal justice system. That concern is reflected, for
example, in the 'fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free."'285 In Ruiz, the Ninth Circuit properly
recognized and applied these principles. 286
Based on the Matthew court's holding, a prosecutor could
constitutionally and purposefully withhold exculpatory
information fully knowing that an individual who was likely
innocent was prepared to plead guilty. This is precisely what
the Ninth Circuit in Sanchez, as echoed in Ruiz, feared would
result if defendants were barred from raising post-plea Brady
claims. 287 As the court in Ruiz pointed out, reason demands
that a prosecutor's duty to disclose Brady evidence becomes
effective before an accused decides to plead guilty. It makes
little sense to wait until after the accused has pled guilty to
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
Schlup u. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also T. Starkie, EVIDENCE 756 (1824) ("The maxim
of the law is ... that it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders should escape, than that
one innocent man should be condemned.").
See generally Newman, Beyond
"Reasonable Doubt," 68 N. Y. U. L. REV. 979980-81 (1993».
286 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1164. As the court noted, "if a defendant may not raise a Brady
claim after a guilty plea, prosecutors may be tempted to deliberately withhold
exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas. . .. Moreover, the
same prosecutorial incentive to withhold Brady information that would arise if guilty
pleas extinguished Brady rights would arise if plea agreements could extinguish those
rights." [d.
287
Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 ("if a defendant may not raise a Brady claim after a
guilty plea, prosecutors may be tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory
information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas.")
284

285
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then provide him with exculpatory evidence. No valid reason
exists to allow a prosecutor to withhold evidence, once it is
obtained, which indicates that a defendant who is about to
plead guilty is in fact innocent.
Many courts and
commentators have argued extensively about the semantics of
the Brady rule itself, specifically whether the materiality
standard can be broadened to cover the plea bargaining
stage. 288 However, the reality that prosecutors could take this
type of action under the approach suggested in Matthew should
lay the debate to rest.
Of course, one can argue that a defendant could force
prosecutors to make Brady disclosures simply by electing to go
to trial and professing their innocence. Such an approach
ignores the enormous pressure that current sentencing laws
place on even innocent defendants to accept a plea bargain
when the evidence known to the defendant makes prevailing at
trial uncertain. 289 There appears to be something inherently
wrong with the notion that we should allow prosecutors to sit
on exculpatory evidence when possibly innocent defendant's
need this information to make a fully informed decision about
whether to plead or not. Such a rule seems to wrongly place
the initial burden of proving innocence on the defendant, the
party least capable of doing SO.290
Any fears that such a rule will lead to defendants
systematically asserting that they would have pled differently
in light of undisclosed Brady evidence in order to have guilty
pleas routinely overturned can be quelled by the objective
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in Ruiz.291 Under this
standard, for a defendant to have a guilty plea reversed based
on an alleged Brady violation, the court would have to be
satisfied that persuasiveness of the evidence would have
provided a plausible enough defense that the defendant would
See also supra text note 78.
Interview with Robert K. Calhoun, Professor, Golden Gate University School of
Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (February 5, 2002).
290 See Lisa M. Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69
FORDHAM L.REV. 1205, 1209 (2000) ("prosecutors have the benefit of a police force that
investigates their cases and gathers evidence for them. This broad access puts
defendants at a great disadvantage in preparing their cases. In the adversary system
in which the prosecutor operates, the availability of these powers leads to great
inequity between the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial.")
291
Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454.
288

289
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have chosen to go to trial rather than plead guilty.292 In cases
in which a court found that such objective evidence did exist
and was withheld by the prosecution during the entry of a
guilty plea, the court's hands should not be tied by virtue of the
fact that the defendant pled guilty. At the very least, an
accused should be granted a new hearing in which the court
could decide whether or not to accept the guilty plea in light of
the new evidence.
Even though applying the Brady rule to post-plea
situations is a potentially difficult task for courts,293 it
nonetheless should be done. The risks of not doing so is too
great. If a defendant pleads guilty based on a set of facts that
are later refuted by evidence that the Government knowingly
and purposefully suppressed, the court should not then be
forced to deny the defendant the opportunity to plead anew or
withdraw his plea and proceed to trial because the defendant
forfeited his right to make a Brady claim by not choosing to go
to trial. Rather, the court should be able to find that its
acceptance of the guilty plea violated due process and the
prosecutor's conduct violated the Brady rule. This is what the
Ninth Circuit decided in Ruiz.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Ruiz properly placed Brady
rights among those constitutional rights so sacred that they
can never be lost, and for good reason. Not only do Brady
waivers violate the principle that guilty pleas must be knowing
for them to be valid, it inhibits the courts and its custodians
from finding the truth. A rule that allows prosecutors to
withhold exculpatory information from an accused during a
plea bargain violates the most fundamental concept of fairness.
As such, Brady waivers impinge on the most deeply rooted
principles underlying the criminal justice system. It is likely
that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
Ruiz due to the dramatic inconsistency among the circuit
courts in applying Brady.294 Given the principles upon which
Id.
See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and
Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 472·87 (2001).
294 See United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 803 (2002).
292

293
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Ruiz was decided, the Supreme Court should affIrm the Ninth
Circuit's decision.
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